Rekwirante stelt drie gronden, te weten schending van artikel 43, leden 2 en 3, juncto artikel 15, lid 3, van verordening nr. 40/94: niet-bewezen gebruik, schending van artikel 43, lid 2, van verordening nr. 40/94: gebrek aan afdoend bewijs van oppositiemerk en schending van artikel 8, lid 1, sub b, van verordening nr. 40/94 ("De waren „kruiden- en vitaminedranken” en „concentraten van vruchtensappen” zijn immers in slechts zeer geringe mate soortgelijk, aangezien zij slechts weinig raakvlakken vertonen.").
Alle drie gronden worden ongegrond bevonden door de AG.
Ten aanzien van de eerste grond concludeert Jacobs als volgt:
"The Court of First Instance stated that where an opposing party maintains that use by a third party constitutes genuine use ‘he claims, by implication, that he consented to that use’. It went on to make two specific points. First, if the use by the third party was without the proprietor’s consent, the use would have infringed the proprietor’s trade mark right and it would therefore evidently have been in the third party’s interest not to disclose evidence thereof to the proprietor. It consequently seems unlikely that the proprietor would be in a position to submit evidence of such use. That approach seems eminently sensible. It would be pointless and contrary to the principles of sound administration and procedural economy for OHIM as a matter of course to require a trade mark proprietor to adduce evidence of consent in such circumstances. The matter would of course be different if the applicant had raised before OHIM the issue of the lack of consent. That however is the Court of First Instance’s second point: there was nothing in the documents before it suggesting that the applicant in the present case had done so. The Court of First Instance accordingly concluded that the above factors ‘formed a sufficiently firm basis to allow the Board of Appeal to conclude that the earlier trade mark had been used with its proprietor’s consent’. I agree with that conclusion and consider that the Court of First Instance did not err with regard to the burden of proof."
Ten aanzien van de laatste grond: "The applicant states that the assessment of the Court of First Instance in paragraphs 66 and 67 of the judgment ‘is not convincing’ and makes a number of assertions which it considers to support its view that the products concerned are not similar. Most of those assertions replicate verbatim, or very nearly so, its assertions to the same effect before the Court of First Instance, although several others are raised for the first time before this Court. They are all statements of fact. In my view, the applicant has not identified any error of law by the Court of First Instance. I agree with OHIM that the third ground of appeal is limited to the facts and should accordingly be dismissed as inadmissible.
In any event, the judgment seems to me to contain a correct summary of the principles governing assessment of similarity laid down by the Court of Justice in Canon and a correct application of those principles to the present case.
Lees hier de conclusie.
Sara Lee wil via de rechter voorkomen dat zijn klant, Capriole Coffie-Service uit Delft, de merknaam Douwe Egberts gebruikt als zoekwoord voor zoekmachine-advertenties. Daarnaast wil het voedingsmiddelenconcern ook het gebruik van Douwe Egberts in de tekst van de advertenties tegenhouden.
(I 829911). De oppositie werd ingesteld tegen waren in de klassen 14 en 34 en werd gebaseerd op waren in de klasse 34."
Rechtbank Utrecht, 15 december 2005. Tefal tegen Ballarini.
Conclusie AG Jacobs 15 december 2005, zaak C-416/04P, The Sunrider Corp (VITAFRUIT)
Rechtbank ’s-Gravenhage, 14 december 2005, Suntrek Tours Ltd. tegenTravel Trex B.V.
